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Recent Work on Frege*

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These three books have very different objectives. What they have in common is that they would probably not have been written but for the revolution in the study of Frege's thought effected by the publication of Dummett's *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (FPL) in 1973. In the earlier book, as everyone knows, Dummett carries out a remarkably sustained and thorough analytical examination of those aspects of Frege's thought which seem to concern semantics and the philosophy of language (discussion of Frege's philosophy of mathematics being reserved for a companion volume which is yet to appear). I say 'seem to concern' because part of what is now at issue between Dummett on the one hand and Sluga and Currie on the other is precisely whether Frege may properly be regarded as having been a 'philosopher of language' at all.

A most striking feature of Dummett's earlier book is its determinedly ahistorical approach. It is only a small exaggeration to say that Dummett grapples with Frege's thought as though it were the thought of a near contemporary. The characteristic focus of philosophical discussion with contemporaries is on what can best be said for or against certain philosophical points of view. Philosophy, as generally now practised, succeeds in being so argumentative only because the protagonists are able to presuppose that the content of disputed theses is, relatively, mutually clear. (That this presupposition is, alas, very often mistaken does not affect the style of discussion which its presence renders possible.) When we do history of philosophy, in contrast – at least when we do it as philosophy – matters are, familiarly, different. The focus of attention shifts to the attempt to clarify content: the project, characteristically, is less to evaluate philosophical achievement than to describe the studied philosophers' claims and points of view. The salient feature of FPL is that Dummett's mode of discussion is almost entirely of the first sort. What Frege thought, and the conceptual apparatus which he employed, are taken to be relatively clear: the question, for Dummett, is rather how much of what Frege thought is true, and how much of that apparatus defensible or useful – questions which forced

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Dummett to allow his discussion to ramify into areas which Frege himself considered little or not at all, thereby (in my opinion) contributing greatly to the value of Dummett's book.

No doubt it was inevitable that there should be a measure of reaction against Dummett's approach. What is surprising has been the extent of the reaction. Most of the literature published since 1974 has been concerned not with the argumentation of *FPL* but, more basically, with Dummett's interpretation of Frege's thought: in particular with his assessment of Frege's place in the controversy between realism and idealism, his interpretation of Frege's apparent platonism, and with his belief that Frege's work marks a new era in philosophy which has distinctively assigned a cardinal place to the philosophy of language. It is in response to this reaction that *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (IFP)* was written. It is, indeed, the outgrowth of Dummett's attempt to write a new introduction for the second edition of *FPL*. And it is to that reaction that Sluga's and to a lesser extent, Currie's book belong.

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The qualification 'to a lesser extent' is wanted in so describing Currie's book because, although he attempts to present a unified interpretation of Frege's philosophy which he conceives to be at odds with Dummett's account, his project is, first and foremost, introductory. No doubt the stimulus to undertake such a project was largely generated by the publication of the first edition of *FPL*. Certainly, Dummett's earlier book generated a sharp surge of interest in Frege among philosophy students at UK universities at least, and this has been reflected by a continuing enhancement of Frege's place in the philosophy curriculum for second-year studies and beyond. Yet at the same time the level of Dummett's writing, and of that of much of the other recent literature, renders it inaccessible to all but the most determined and talented undergraduate students. Currie's project is therefore very worthwhile and his book appears at a good time.

I cannot vouch at first hand for the efficacy of Currie's book as a teaching text, but there are several reasons for thinking that it will work well. It is, by and large, clearly written, and contains a full bibliography of Frege's work as well as a substantial catalogue of secondary material. The demands that it makes on the reader's philosophical and logical experience are very small; the exposition of *Begriffsschrift* might, indeed, be followed by a student quite innocent of formal logic. No important aspect of Frege's thought is left unconsidered, and the presentation of Frege's ideas follows an orderly, historical sequence, separate chapters being devoted to the *Begriffsschrift*, to the leading ideas of *Grundlagen*, and to Frege's philosophical logic, with special reference to the key notions of function, concept, object, sense and reference, and judgment. A further chapter is devoted to presentation of the fundamentals of the system of *Grundgesetze*, with a sketch of the derivation of Russell's paradox within the system and of Frege's unsuccessful attempt to repair the damage. The final chapter is given to general reflection on Frege's philosophical method and orientation. There are plenty of controversial and, indeed, as it seems to me, mistaken features of Currie's interpretation of Frege. But where he is being controversial, he usually makes it plain that he is; and, in any case, since, despite Dummett's best expectations, the interpretation of Frege has turned out to be a controversial business, one thing which an intro-
duction to his thought has to make plain are precisely the areas in which controversy
did afflict our reading of him. So, with one reservation to be voiced below,
Currie's book can be recommended to teachers of Frege as a most useful classroom
text, though its hardback price (no paperback has, to my knowledge, been issued)
will of course deter most students from buying it. (Harvester would appear to have
joined the ranks of those publishers who have given up any attempt to consider,
let alone serve, their authors' intended readership, falling back on the relatively
secure profits to be squeezed from the library market alone.)

It is in his concluding chapter on 'Frege's Philosophical Method', that Currie
highlights what he conceives are the most serious of his disagreements with Dum-
mett. For Dummett, as remarked, Frege pioneered both the modern conception
of the philosophy of language and the modern (though not universal) belief in the
philosophical centrality of the philosophy of language. Currie wishes to urge, in
contrast, that Frege's concerns were, first and foremost, epistemological; that,
rather than initiating a new era in philosophy, he inherited the questions, and
belongs to the tradition of Descartes, Hume, and Kant. Frege's central project,
in Currie's view, was that of delineating a satisfactorily objective and a priori
foundation for our knowledge of the principles of number-theory and analysis. The
dominant antagonism in his writings is therefore not, as Dummett supposed, to
idealism, but to the naturalism of such writers as Boole and Mill: writers who
viewed logic and mathematics as descriptive enterprises, concerned with the actual
operations of human thinking or the behaviour of physical objects. Frege's project,
in contrast, was to reconcile and sustain the normativity, objectivity, and epistemic
accessibility of those sciences.

Several things follow, in Currie's view, from this corrected emphasis. First,
Dummett's interpretation of the famous Context Principle of Grundlagen as a
semantical principle (or rather as a pair of semantical principles concerning, respec-
tively, sense and reference) is misguided. The Principle should rather be interpreted
in such a way as to inform and explain Frege's essentially epistemological enterprise.
In particular,

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it \text{[the Principle] argues the replacement of the naturalistic model of epistemic relations}
\text{in terms of perceptual ones, and the abandonment of criteria of knowledge drawn}
\text{from the perceptual analogue. Abandoning the naturalistic model was an essential}
\text{step in the construction of a viable theory of mathematical knowledge. It is as a}
\text{contribution to such a theory rather than to a theory of meaning, that the Context}
\text{Principle must be understood.}^{9}
\]

I shall say more of this below.

Second, Frege's distinction between sense and reference should likewise be seen
as a contribution to epistemology rather than to the theory of meaning. The most
important element, in Currie's view, in Frege's notion of sense, is that of information
content; and Frege's stress on the objectivity of sense thus emerges as an emphasis
on a precondition of the possibility of objective informational exchange. What is
not clear is why, in advancing this view, Currie believes that he is saying something
at odds with the belief that the sense/reference distinction, if sustained, is a
contribution to the philosophical theory of meaning. But a clue emerges on pages
169–71. Currie believes that certain passages in Frege (he cites, in particular, the
footnote on page 58 in 'On Sense and Reference' in Geach & Black)^4 are, near
enough, inescapably to be read as advancing the view that the sense of proper
names can in general be specified by paraphrase in terms of definite descriptions.
On the other hand, the theory of meaning, as Currie remarks, if it is to involve
— as on Dummett’s conception — a characterization of a speaker’s knowledge of his language, must

contain provision for the fact that a person’s knowledge of language cannot always be
such that it could be given a non-trivial verbal explication.2

Hence, Currie wishes to conclude, we have a threefold choice: we may suppose that Frege succeeded only in making a defective contribution to the theory of meaning, or we may — with Dummett — cast about for more or less far-fetched readings of passages like that referred to, or we may — with Currie — recognize that Frege’s notion of sense is not intended as a contribution to the theory of meaning, so that there is no tension between his claim that the senses of names are capable of descriptive paraphrase and the truisms that understanding an expression does not in general consist in the capacity to paraphrase it and is not in general achieved by receipt of a paraphrase.

This argument, it seems to me, typifies the only serious fault in Currie’s book. To be sure, the dilemma is spurious and Currie’s resolution of it specious. For one thing it would be quite consistent with acknowledging that not every expression can be learned definitionally to hold that, once learnt, the meaning of any expression may be characterized definitionally; for another, someone who holds that language must contain expressions whose meanings may neither be learned nor characterized definitionally could quite consistently regard that class as excluding all proper names; and, for a third, the pressure to find some better interpretation of passages like the one Currie adverts to remains even when we resolutely keep in mind the interpretation of ‘sense’ as ‘information content’ — since the idea that the information content of expressions in general, in so far as the notion is clear, admits descriptive paraphrase is no less rebarbative than denial of the truisms above. (What, for example, would be an appropriate paraphrase of the information content of colour predicates?) But the real point is that Currie is tempted into bad argumentation of this sort because he has only a fragile grasp of what, in regarding Frege as a philosopher of language and a theorist of meaning, Dummett is essentially doing. For Currie it is apparently axiomatic that epistemology and the philosophy of language have no overlap. It is therefore of paramount importance to be clear to which area of concern Frege’s notion of sense is designed as a contribution, there being no possibility that it might contribute to both. But the revolution which Frege’s thought effected — if Dummett is right — consisted not so much in a shift of attention from one area of philosophy to another as the gradual realization that progress can be made in the original area only by reformulation of the old questions in new terms. Dummett is famous for the view that a very large class of traditional philosophical disputes — between dualist and behaviourist in the philosophy of mind, between materialist and phenomenalist about the external world, between platonist and constructivist in pure mathematics, between absolutist and relativist concerning the nature of space, and so on — rest, however dimly their original protagonists perceived the fact, on divergent assumptions about meaning; and thus are, at bottom, best formulated as disputes about meaning. For Dummett at least, the justification for the recent upsurge of interest in the theory of meaning lies in this fact: the promise is, ultimately, of progress with what have proved some of the most intractable metaphysical disputes. No doubt Frege had no inkling of exactly this idea. But he had a vivid perception — unmistakable from even the most cursory reading of Grundlagen — of a closely related one. Simply: he had no prospect of carrying through the epistemological programme which Currie very accurately
characterizes without a systematic account of the content of statements in number-theory and analysis. Only by, in effect, a programme of rigorous analysis of the meanings of arithmetical statements could he set up a framework in which his leading questions would admit of sharp formulation and his celebrated logicist answer. To argue for the inclusion of arithmetic within logic, Frege had to set up a logic; but the logic which he needed was richer and more sophisticated than anything previously invented and so it needed to be developed in tandem with a new conception of the logically contributive features of natural language, of the essential logical structure of the relevant statements of natural language. But the syntactic categories which he was thereby led to invent are of course nothing other than generalized semantic ones (that is a remark about the notion of syntax, not about the particular syntactic categories which Frege devised). In other words: there is no such thing as inventing a logic, adequate for the representation of certain intuitively apprehended patterns of valid inference in natural language, without engaging in semantic theorizing about the statements which participate in those patterns. In this sense Frege's epistemological enterprise was such that he could not but have been a theorist of meaning; and Currie's antithesis between the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of language is entirely misconceived.

Reverting to Currie's would-be 'epistemological' interpretation of Frege's notion of sense, it is of course quite uncontroversial that Frege intended the notion to be associated with that of information content, since it could not otherwise have contributed to the explanation of the informational non-equivalence of sentences differing only by containing distinct but co-referential singular terms. At the same time it is impossible to see – at least, this is the force of Frege's argument – how the information content of such sentences could differ unless there was more to the semantics of those singular terms than, as we should now put it, reference. Everything which Currie's interpretation demands of Frege's notion of sense is afforded by viewing the sense of a singular term, like that of a predicate, as being constituted by its association with a condition satisfaction of which determines its reference. The information afforded by a true contingent identity statement will then be that a pair of such conditions are co-satisfied. Frege may or may not have held that such a condition can always be expressed descriptively, though Dummett is surely right to suppose that he had no need to do so. (Again, it would be as gratuitous, and foolish, to suppose so as to suppose that descriptive paraphrase must always be possible of the condition whose satisfaction determines that a particular predicate may truly be applied to a particular object.) What seems to be certain is that Currie has no real quarrel with Dummett, and that he could therefore have avoided infelicities, like that illustrated above, into which his desire to have the best of his (non-existent) quarrel seduces him.

Qualification, then, is necessary to the favourable estimate, offered above, of Currie's book as an introduction to Frege's thought. The book will serve well as an introduction to Frege's writings but it will be liable to induce a false perspective in which to attempt to assess Frege's real achievement. In Currie's view, and in that of so many others, Russell's paradox destroyed Frege's project. So the epistemological enterprise was never carried through: Frege might deserve a brilliancy prize, but he lost the game. Against this I wish, for the reason I have sketched, to set the. After Dummett, conventional wisdom that the perception of the centrality of questions to do with meaning which informs the work of Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Dummett himself, and so many other contemporary philosophers, originated with Frege, even if many of the questions of current concern were quite
undreamt of by him. For there is implicit in his ‘logicist manifesto’, *Grundlagen*, the insight that the theory of knowledge in general, in so far as it is an enterprise concerned to vindicate our aspirations to knowledge and to make plain the bases of knowledge where we have it, has to be based on recreative analysis of the content of statements putatively known. Much of Frege’s achievement in the philosophy of language is, admittedly, a spin-off from his attempt to execute his specific logicist programme and can survive the failure of that programme. But Currie is in no position to acknowledge this achievement; and he is unable, or unwilling, to give due prominence to the revolution in philosophical approach which Frege’s work initiated. It is only when the real fruits of that revolution have clearly emerged that a final estimate of Frege’s accomplishment will be possible.

I remarked above on the ahistorical character of Dummett’s critical exegesis of Frege’s thought. Such an approach comes easily for two reasons. First, the experience of reading Frege is quite different to that of reading most great philosophers of the past. Almost always his intentions in a particular passage are well sign-posted; almost always the structure of his argument seems to be clear; his informal writing is, for its subject-matter, remarkably free of technicality, and such terms of art as he employs are almost always patiently and lucidly explained. In some ways this clarity is, admittedly, superficial. Frege’s work is nevertheless to a large extent refreshingly free of the textual opacity, multiplicity of formulation, and motivational obscurity which dog the would-be interpreter of, say, the *Tractatus*, Russell, and Wittgenstein’s later writings respectively.

The second, perhaps profounder reason is that Dummett’s approach is Frege’s own. In his essay ‘On the Principle of Inertia’ Frege wrote that ‘For the logical concept, there is no development, no history’. In the same essay Frege wrote that ‘What comes first logically and in the nature of the case is not what is psychologically and historically first’. Orthodoxy in analytical philosophy takes it to be a timeless project, devoted to eternal questions with, could we but find them, eternal answers. Frege would have regarded this timelessness as endemic in the timeless nature of rational thought itself. And Dummett’s ahistorical approach to Frege simply reflects this Fregean perspective on the subject-matter of analytical philosophy which is our inheritance. At the limit of the idea, and in the absence of obvious textual difficulties, we would suppose that it is of as little relevance to know when an analytical philosopher wrote, who taught him, whom he had read and most admired or felt most strongly critical of, etc. than it would be to know these things about the author of a mathematical proof.

Sluga believes that this Fregean legacy of ahistoricism in philosophy is profoundly misguided, and that Dummett’s immersion within it has led him only to write a book which ‘can serve as a paradigm for the failure of analytic philosophers to come to grips with the actual historical Frege’. Sluga’s own book aims to set matters to rights. In a series5 whose brief is explicit presentation and analysis of the leading arguments of important philosophers, Sluga chooses to devote almost all of the first sixty pages to a discursive treatment of philosophical currents prior to and prevalent during Frege’s life. Not Frege but such figures as Gruppe, Czolbe, and Lotze take centre stage. It is only in the third chapter, starting on page 65, that Sluga finally begins his exposition of *Begriffsschrift*. And from there on
exposition and commentary upon Frege's explicitly presented ideas always plays a subordinate role to Sluga's attempts to explain their historical aetiology. To §§55–83 of *Grundlagen*, the heart of that work, and indeed of Frege's entire philosophy of mathematics, Sluga devotes, astonishingly, a mere five pages. The distinction between sense and reference, on the other hand, the aspect of Frege's thought which has perhaps been most intensely controversial and vital in recent philosophy of language, is accordingly devoted all of nine pages at the end of Chapter 5. Sluga is hardly at all concerned to take on, with Frege's help, the issues to which Frege's thought was devoted. Frege's ideas are sketched only to the extent necessary to give content to the historical and comparative perspective on his work which Sluga is keen to establish. If Dummett's Frege was a pioneering genius, whose distinctive philosophical achievement was born from his brain 'unfertilised by external influences', it is a no less pointful caricature of Sluga's Frege to say that he did no more than divert a philosophical stream that ran through him, that he was a mere pawn in the hands of the Cunning of Philosophical Reason.

Dummett and Sluga have crossed swords, of course, prior to their two recent books, in a series of articles in this journal. In his new book, Dummett devotes a sixty-page appendix to Sluga's book in which he is, as one would expect, severely critical both of Sluga's general methodology and his specific views about Frege. The central question, once again, is of Frege's originality, in particular, the extent of his debt to Lotze. According to Sluga, Frege probably derived from Lotze: his distinction between concept and object (p. 138); his objections to the correspondence theory of truth (p. 114); the *Begriffsschrift* account of identity statements (p. 151); the conception of judgment, in particular, the distinction between the act of judgment and the judgeable content, that figures in *Begriffsschrift*; and the notion of objectivity which in *Grundlagen* he applies to numbers and distinguishes from *Wirklichkeit* (p. 118). Sluga also suggests that Frege owed the logicist thesis, in part, to Lotze (the other source offered by Sluga being Trendelenburg). Now there is, of course, a difference between charting influences and doing history of ideas. Even if it were certain that Sluga was quite right to interpret Lotze as advancing themes and conceptions importantly similar to those which we associate with Frege, it's quite another matter to establish that Frege was indebted to Lotze for them. In the Appendix to *IFP* Dummett quarrels with Sluga's interpretation of Lotze in a number of respects, notably on Lotze's notion of objectivity, on Lotze's interpretation of the logicist thesis (he seems to have regarded logical truth as synthetic *a priori*, and in any case held the thesis in a very inchoate form and regarded it, unlike Frege, as being true of mathematics in its entirety), and on Lotze's arguments about the indefinability of truth. Dummett also adverts to a fragment among Frege's posthumous papers which appears to constitute a series of comments by Frege on Lotze's Introduction to his *Logik*. As Dummett remarks, incontrovertible evidence that Frege did indeed read Lotze would, presumably, have been welcome to Sluga. It is therefore surprising that Sluga makes no reference to this particular fragment. What would be less welcome to Sluga is that many of Frege's comments are critical, and that, as Dummett says,

> Although he [Frege] was in agreement with him [Lotze] on certain points, he does not seem to have been deeply impressed.

Never having read Lotze, I am incompetent to judge whether Sluga or Dummett interprets him better. What is clear is that if Dummett is right, then Sluga's attempt to apply what he considers to be an appropriately historical method to the interpret-
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ation of Frege has resulted only in misrepresentation of Lotze's views and a quite unjustified playing down of Frege's originality.

It would be excusable if an outsider, coming across this at times regretfully ill-humoured debate between Sluga and Dummett, could not see what all the fuss was about. Dummett writes

In interpreting a philosopher, there can be no substitute for thinking through, rigorously and in detail, what his arguments are and how they are supposed to work, what hidden assumptions must hold good if they are to be cogent, what answers could be given to objections, what relation one thesis has to another, in short, for subjecting his work to logical analysis.

This is not to say, however, that such an analytical exercise constitutes the whole methodology of philosophical interpretation. To over-simplify slightly, what Dummett describes is what analytical philosophers generally would regard as the appropriate way of evaluating philosophical writing; and evaluation of a philosopher's arguments and theses is possible only when we have identified them. Obviously the primary guide in the task of identification must remain the philosopher's writings. But who would wish to deny that it may also prove of great assistance to know whom the studied philosopher had read, what estimate he held of them, and how he conceived his project in relation to theirs, etc.? Dummett, indeed, continues the above quoted passage

This is not in the least to deny the importance of the historical context. We need to recognise which theses a given philosopher took to be familiar and which new, which uncontroversial and which contentious; we need to catch his allusions; we need to identify what he conceived himself as opposing.

Sluga, however, unmistakably intends not merely to charge Dummett with an insufficiently historically informed interpretation of Frege's views but to expose a misconception which, he believes, flaws a great deal of analytical philosophy as currently practised. Yet how can this be right when so much contemporary work by people who would unhesitatingly regard themselves as analytical philosophers is marked by the most meticulous historical and textual scholarship?

In fact, however, the debate is a profound one. For it seems that Sluga must be taken as wanting to call into question the validity of the whole analytical enterprise as briefly characterized in the first quotation from \textit{IFP} in the immediately preceding paragraph. His charge against Dummett is not so much that, by paying insufficient attention to Frege's historical context, Dummett has misidentified much of what Frege thought, so that his analytical examination, of whatever independent interest, largely misrepresents Frege. Rather it is that the assumption of the timeless character of the subject-matter of analytic philosophy, which Dummett inherits from Frege, is quite mistaken. Sluga writes

From its very beginnings, the \textit{analytic} tradition has been oriented towards an abstract, formal account of language and meaning, and not towards the comprehending of concrete historical processes. Frege himself considered his task that of the analysis of timeless, objective thought. "The thought is something impersonal", he wrote in 1897. "When we see the sentence "2 + 3 = 5" written on a wall, we recognise the thought expressed by it completely and it is altogether irrelevant for our understanding to know who wrote it." If we apply this doctrine to the analysis of statements in philosophical texts, we are led to conclude that the thoughts expressed by them are objective, timeless, and impersonal, however subjective, historical and personal their formulation may be. The task of the interpreter is then seen as freeing the thought from its
subjective, historical clothing and thereby laying it open to assessment. The method of interpretation will become that of rational reconstruction.\textsuperscript{16}

And a little later,

There is one notable step Dummett has taken beyond Fregean objectivism. Influenced by the later Wittgenstein and by the Dutch intuitionist Brouwer, he argues that a theory of meaning cannot be a theory of objective, timeless thoughts, but must be a theory of understanding and that such understanding occurs and changes in time. One might therefore expect him to conclude that the investigation of the meaning of Frege’s statements cannot consist in a rational reconstruction of the timeless, impersonal thoughts supposedly expressed by them, but that it must proceed on the assumption that the meaning of actual philosophical discourse is both historical and personal. Such expectations are disappointed, because Dummett’s recognition of temporality of thinking is limited by the formalist interpretation of that idea he has inherited from Kant via Brouwer. ‘Temporality is understood in this Kantian tradition as abstract and formal, not as concrete historical time.’\textsuperscript{17}

This is the crux of the dispute. There is no question but that very many contemporary analytical philosophers would subscribe to this assimilation, criticized by Sluga, of philosophical subject-matter to a certain conception of the pure mathematical. Clearly, moreover, the conception is problematic, not merely in the philosophical case but in the mathematical one too. No one familiar with the writings of, for example, Quine or the later Wittgenstein, could rest easy with the assumption of diachronic conceptual stability involved. Sluga, however, does not appear to appreciate what deep water he plunges himself into when he calls the assumption into question. The importance of historical context which Dummett allows in the quotation above is quite consistent with the timelessness of philosophical concepts: an appropriate sensitivity to historical context may be necessary if we are to understand what a philosopher of the past meant – but then the assumption remains that what he meant is, in principle, still accessible to us, precisely the assumption of timelessness which Sluga appears to want to call into question. In fact it is only on the assumption of timelessness that Sluga’s own historical methodology can receive its most natural, though only partial justification. What, then, is its justification on Sluga’s view? The trouble, it seems to me, is that Sluga has failed to see that what is enjoined by a rejection of the diachronic stability of philosophical concepts is far from being the notion that such concepts change. Change is intelligible to us only when we can form a conception of the contrast between the relevant states before and after it takes place. If we could do that in the present case, then we would, of necessity, be able to form an understanding of relevant philosophical concepts as they used to be – which is just to say that they remain, after all, still accessible to us, contrary to the repudiation of timelessness. Sluga seems to have some vague idea that because we are, so to speak, on shifting ground, some sort of historical perspective is essential if we are to achieve any sort of übersicht on the direction and extent of the shift. But, extending the metaphor, that is to presuppose that there is, after all, an attainable stable and stationary point from which we can survey the movement around us. Someone, however, who really rejects the assumption of timeless conceptual stability ought to abjure any such picture. Whether or not such a stance is coherent, it must at least enjoin the view that our interpretation of philosophers of other periods is ineliminably conditioned by the conceptions of our own time. Far from suggesting the replacement of an analytical methodology by an historical one, Sluga’s complaint against the assump-
tion which Frege bequeaths to us would, if sustained, lead to the conclusion that the task for which Sluga believes he has a superior method is actually impossible. In my Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects I have quite self-consciously used, in the formulation and defence of Frege's thought in Grundlagen, concepts and arguments which seem to belong to the work of later writers. Anticipating the complaint that such an approach will inevitably lead to radical misinterpretations, I wrote in the Preface

The fact is, however, that we can learn from the work of philosophers of other periods only if we are prepared to run this risk. For we can profit from their efforts only by finding grounds for taking seriously the questions which they took seriously; and by arguing, as best we can, for and against the points of view which they adopted. This enterprise is, inevitably, coloured by the habits of philosophical thought of our own time; and this colouring will worry nobody who has grasped the simple truth that there is no timeless perspective from which we can document faithfully the actual, historical thought of Plato, Ockham, Kant or Frege. Or rather: this documentation is already accomplished in their own writings. Our task is to appropriate their thought for our own generation.9

The 'simple truth' referred to was not meant to be the thesis that philosophical concepts have no timeless existence; I meant merely to express a scepticism that we can often attain the understanding of key concepts and theses possessed by philosophers separated from us by centuries. But the view of philosophical exegesis endorsed in that passage seems to me exactly what is appropriate if timelessness is rejected. And Sluga, accordingly, has failed properly to think through the methodological implications of repudiating the Fregean heritage. Rather than a renaissance of historicism in philosophical method, all that is then available to us is the emphasis on rational, recreative endeavour, which, ironically enough, is what in Dummett's approach Sluga finds most misconceived.

4

The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy contains a great deal more than criticism of Sluga. There are twenty chapters in the main body of the book, re-opening discussion of, inter alia, Frege's place in the dispute between realism and idealism, indexicality and indirect speech, the distinction between simple and complex predicates, Kripke on rigid designation and the causal theory of reference, Geach on identity, and the Context Principle. In addition, the long appendix on Sluga is preceded by one on David Bell's Frege's Theory of Judgement and succeeded by one dealing with the Preface to the 1980 edition in book form of Kripke's Naming and Necessity. The discussion throughout is, as one would expect, of a uniformly demanding and rewarding quality. Individual chapters are more or less self-contained, so that it is possible to read them in isolation in preparation for a re-reading of relevant material in FPL. The tone of some of the polemic grates a little, at least on this reviewer's ear, Currie in particular coming in for some searing blasts (on the strength not of his new book but of his review of Frege: Philosophy of Language and his article on 'Frege's Realism'). It is probable that the objectives of IFP did not require it to be so long. Likely to receive most attention are the long concluding chapters on the Context Principle and the proper formulation of Realism, together with the Appendix on Kripke. The latter makes it clear once
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and for all that Dummett's criticism of Kripke's doctrine of proper names and rigid designation rests not on the identification of rigid designation with wide scope but on treating them as competing theoretical descriptions of a certain class of linguistic phenomena. The book is unquestionably a highly important contribution to the interpretation of Frege, of Dummett, and to the philosophy of language in general.

5

The Context Principle

In this concluding section I wish briefly to comment on the conflicting interpretations offered respectively by Currie, Sluga, and Dummett of the Context Principle dominating Frege's "Grundlagen." My concern will be only with the proper interpretation of the Principle as it informs the argument of "Grundlagen," and not, directly at least, with the question of its survival into his later writings, its originality to Frege, etc. Currie, it seems to me, hits the nail on the head when he insists on the constraint in interpretation of the Principle that:

An interpretation must show how the Principle functions in the "Grundlagen" as a defence of Frege's own theory, and as a means of analysing the defects in rival views about the foundations of arithmetic.24

Currie's own interpretation is offered on page 151 of his book. He finds in the Principle a pair of theses: first, that analysis of a concept, and the definitions to which it gives rise, should, in conjunction with certain other principles, entail intuitively correct judgments concerning that concept; and, second, that we have an adequate grasp of a concept provided our analysis of it is shown to deliver intuitively correct judgments, whether or not we have the capacity to form any idea of the objects which fall under that concept.

The first constitutive thesis should, according to Currie, be seen as informing Frege's criticisms of empiricist, formalist, and psychologist accounts of number. Crudely, there is no deducing any of the significant properties of numbers from the properties of physical collections, of inscriptions, or of mental ideas. An explanation of what numbers fundamentally are, what arithmetic is about, ought, at the very least, to give us an insight into why the fundamental laws of number theory hold. Empiricist, formalist, and psychologist accounts of number signal fail this test.

The second constitutive thesis, on the other hand, entitles us to regard a concept as being in good order once we have an analysis of it which vindicates our intuitive preconceptions about which judgments involving that concept are correct, even if the concept is one whose instances are abstract so that we cannot picture or imagine them. It is accordingly, in Currie's view, this thesis which Frege is putting to work when, in "Grundlagen" §§58-61, he confronts the objection to his conception of numbers as 'self-subsistent objects' that we are unable to form of these objects any definite idea.

Roughly, then, the Context Principle embodies, in Currie's view, a necessary condition for the soundness of an analysis of a concept, viz. that the definitions which it generates entail or otherwise sanction basic, intuitively correct judgments involving that concept; and a sufficient condition for our having a satisfactory grasp of the concept, in need of no further account or justification, namely that the concept admits of analysis from which what we regard as its fundamental properties flow. Thus Currie concludes that
While the Context Principle tells Frege that a definition of number must meet constraints not recognised by the proponents of other theories, it eases his epistemological problems in other directions. It obviates the necessity that he will otherwise be under to postulate some special faculty which enables us to ‘perceive’ mathematical objects. It tells him, in other words, that, while a theoretically adequate definition of number is necessary for successful analysis of the concept, it is also, happily, sufficient. Currie is, it seems to me, certainly right that (something close to) this idea is at least part of the content which the Context Principle is best interpreted as having. So interpreted, of course, Currie believes the Principle chimes best with his over-all interpretation of Grundlagen as developing an epistemological project. Pressure could, no doubt, be put on the Principle as Currie formulates it – one might, in particular, wonder about the content of its second part in the case of concepts associated with no formal body of intuitively acceptable truths. What is more important, however, is that Currie’s interpretation is evidently at odds with his own interpretational test. For if ‘theoretical adquacy’ is, in Frege’s view, sufficient to constitute successful analysis of a concept, what is the explanation of Frege’s sustaining the ‘Julius Caesar’ objection to the contextual definition of numerical identity in terms of one-one correspondence canvassed in §63? The objection is not that that definition is ‘theoretically inadequate’. On the contrary, Frege would have been well aware that that definition would, in conjunction with appropriate elements in his logic, have furnished all the fundamental truths concerning the natural numbers, including the axioms for successor and the principle of mathematical induction. Far from concerning its inability to supply a foundation for our intuitively correct judgments concerning the natural numbers, Frege’s objection to the contextual definition is that it is inadequate to decide the truth-values of statements which, ordinarily, do not figure in our arithmetical thinking at all: ‘mixed’ identity statements involving expressions formed by means of the numerical operator on one side and non-numerical singular terms on the other. And, to stress, these statements play no central role in our ordinary arithmetical thinking in the exact sense that, or so it appears, someone could have competence extending to all normal pure and applied number-theoretic purposes without having any view whatever on the truth-values of these statements.

It might be replied that it certainly is an element, if a not very important one, in our corpus of intuitively correct arithmetical beliefs that Julius Caesar is not a number; and hence that Frege, in faulting the contextual definition for failing to yield that consequence, is still perfectly in accord with Currie’s interpretation of the Context Principle. But, of course, we cannot properly be described as having any such belief unless natural number is already intuitively viewed as a property of objects. In particular, it is legitimate to demand that truth-conditions be established for mixed identity statements involving numerical terms if, and only if, it is a correct constraint on the sought-for analysis that it establish natural number as a sortal concept, like person, tree, river, and city: a concept whose instances, if it has any, will constitute a distinctive sort of object which the world contains. It seems to me obvious that this platonistic conception of number – for what else is platonism about the natural numbers except the belief that natural number is a sortal concept? – is very far from being part of the intuitive foundation of our number-theoretic beliefs; and hence that to regard judgments of the (in general) falsity of mixed numerical identity statements as forming part of that intuitively acceptable core of arithmetical judgments which a satisfactory analysis of number
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should, in accordance with Currie's interpretation of the Context Principle, sustain is simply tendentious.

In my judgment, then, Currie is certainly right in seeking to find an element in the Context Principle which will explain why Frege thought he had no need to worry about the impossibility of our forming 'pictures' of the individual numbers, or to explain the possibility of some sort of direct cognitive contact with numbers, akin to the contact which our perceptual faculties give us with material objects. But the correct formulation of this element cannot be Currie's suggestion that 'theoretical adequacy' in the definition of number is sufficient for successful analysis, and that no further epistemological questions then arise. If Frege had held that view, he ought not to have sustained the 'Julius Caesar' objection. And, in any case, it would surely be preferable to have an account of the Context Principle which explains the platonism underlying that objection, the platonism which Frege argues for in only the most sketchy and, from one point of view, irrelevant way (§57) yet which is so important in the development of the argument of Grundlagen.

Because of its centrality, and the difficulty of interpreting it properly, the Context Principle evidently provides something of an experimentum crucis for Sluga's claims on behalf of his historicist approach. In fact, however, it is hardly any easier to interpret Sluga's interpretation of the Context Principle than it is to interpret Frege. Sluga claims that what Frege expresses by those famous sentences in Grundlagen is an old doctrine, originating in the thought of Kant, that Judgements are not formed out of previously given constituents, but ... possess an initial transcendental unity out of which we gain concepts by analysis.

By the late nineteenth-century, Sluga tells us, this doctrine had become a standard argument in anti-naturalistic theories of knowledge, used in that role in the writings both of Sigwart and Lotze. And it was through Lotze's influence, he claims, that the doctrine originally reached Frege. Again, writing of Frege's explicit methodological formulation of the Principle, on page x of the Introduction to Grundlagen, Sluga asserts,

It is meant here primarily as a methodological principle for the analysis of sentences of ordinary language. But the implication seems to be that there is a priority of sentence-meaning over word-meaning for every language, including a logically perfect one. In this stronger sense the Principle would amount to the reaffirmation of the Kantian doctrine of the priority of judgements over concepts.

What exactly is this thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts? Sluga distinguishes four distinct elements. First, the contents of judgments are 'epistemically primary'. Second, concepts are always reached through the splitting up of judgments, through analysis; they are not given separately, the judgment is not composed out of previously given constituents. Third, a concept 'is nothing complete, but only a predicate of a judgement, for which a subject is still lacking'. And, fourth, whereas in a logically perfect language, we can require the signs making up the expression of a judgment to correspond exactly to the parts of the judgment which logical analysis has distinguished, we cannot safely impose that requirement on natural language. There we can presuppose only that the sentence as a whole expresses a thought. Whether or not the parts of the sentence have a meaning is open to question; and the meaning we assign to such parts would depend on the meaning of the whole sentence.
Sluga's formulation of and glosses upon each of these four theses have an elusive character which makes for frustrating reading. The crux of the matter, however, is whether something can be lifted from what he says which will satisfy Currie's test for interpretations of the Principle. And the prospects look decidedly bleak. Whatever the correct interpretation of the Context Principle, two things are evident from the most cursory reading of *Grundlagen*. First the Principle is to inform the analysis and interpretation of numerical singular terms, so that no view about the essentially predicative, or incomplete, character of concepts, relations, and functions can provide the key to Frege's discussion in *Grundlagen* §§58–61. (Sluga's third ingredient thesis, is, in any case, better seen as part of the point of Frege's *third* self-directed methodological injunction [*Grundlagen*, Introduction, p. x], viz. 'never to lose sight of the distinction between object and concept.') And the fourth ingredient thesis, whether or not it involves, as Dummett suggests, 'the most serious confusion' to regard it as a component either of the priority thesis, or, what Sluga takes to be the same thing, the Context Principle, is evidently, whatever else it may be, a thesis about natural language; whereas it is, again, unmistakable, that Frege intends the Context Principle to justify certain patterns of explanation of, and to forestall certain questions concerning, constructions of the formal language in which he proposes to embed the 'science of number'.

The second ingredient thesis would deserve the title of the 'thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts' on its own. The thesis is, indeed, present in *Begriffsschrift* and involves, *inter alia*, that there need be no uniquely correct resolution of a statement into logically contributive constituents; more specifically, that the logical form of a statement should be viewed as a function of the demands of the inferential context in which it is embedded. Thus 'Brutus admired Cato' may legitimately be viewed as of any of the forms $R(b,c)$, $\phi(b)$, $\psi(c)$, depending upon whether it is to subserve the inference to 'Someone admired someone', or (in conjunction with 'Everyone who admired Cato was a Republican') to 'Brutus was a Republican', or (in conjunction with 'Everyone whom Brutus admired was a Stoic') to 'Cato was a Stoic'. Whatever merits this idea may have, however, it is again quite unclear how to put it to argumentative use in the crucial passages in *Grundlagen*, since, to repeat, Frege is there concerned with defending the use of certain sorts of numerical singular term, whereas this thesis concerns the justification for discerning a particular incomplete expression as featuring within a statement. It is true that Frege talks, in the crucial passage (§64) where he is discussing the contextual definition of identity of direction in terms of parallelism, of 'carving up the content' of '$a$ is parallel to $b$' in a way different to that suggested by the overt syntactic form of that sentence and thereby, 'arriving at a new concept'. And the idea that the content in question is so amenable to being 'carved up' in different ways, first as a judgment that a pair of lines are parallel and second as a judgment that the direction of those lines are identical, has a common presupposition with the *Begriffsschrift* doctrine, namely, obviously, that there need be no uniquely correct description of the logical structure of a judgment. But that presupposition is obviously quite insufficient to justify the very special proposal which Frege is making at that stage of *Grundlagen*. Someone who accepted the presupposition could still perfectly reasonably demand from Frege an argument why it is permissible to stipulate the obtaining of an equivalence relation between things of one sort as sufficient for identity under a new concept. Do we not thereby simply hypothesize spurious entities? Frege is quite explicitly concerned with this kind of reservation; but none of the three elements in Sluga's interpretation so far
reviewed goes any way towards explaining what right to discount it Frege could have felt that he had.

All that remains then is Sluga’s first ingredient thesis, the thesis of the epistemic primacy of the contents of judgments over concepts. Sluga quotes a letter of Frege in which he wrote:

I do not think that the formation of concepts can precede judgement, for that would presuppose the independent existence of concepts; but I imagine the concept originating in the analysis of a judgeable content. I do not think that for every judgeable content there is only one possible analysis or that among the various possibilities one can always claim objective precedence.

Now the most natural interpretation of this is as an expression of Sluga’s second ingredient. So how exactly are the first and second ingredients supposed to differ? The only other passage which Sluga quotes in this connection, is, as Dummett complains, open to exactly the same query. What the thesis of the epistemic primacy of judgment over concepts ought to be is the claim that our grasp of the content of a judgment is never mediated by grasp of concepts figuring in it, that we have, indeed, no conception of the ingredients of a judgment save as arrived at by reflective analysis of the judgment – where ‘reflective analysis’ is contrasted with the unthinkingly formed, intuitive understanding of the judgment at which we arrive on first hearing the sentence expressing it. On the face of it, such a thesis would be at odds with what seems a platitude, that we understand novel sentences in virtue of understanding the expressions which compose them and the significance of their mode of composition. A defender of the thesis would have to reply, I think, that this sub-sentential ‘understanding’ is not correctly to be viewed as involving grasp of concepts; rather we are, no doubt, caused to arrive at a particular interpretation of the sentence by the presence in it of certain ingredients and the way in which it is composed, but no knowledge of ours corresponds to these causal connections – at least not if ‘knowledge’ is taken to involve the exercise of concepts and the contemplation of thoughts.

I can do no better than this suggestion, and I have no doubt that it corresponds to nothing whatever in Frege’s thought. It is, in effect, a rather sophisticated suggestion concerning the proper interpretation of theories of meaning in the modern sense, cautioning against treating the axioms which they contain for sub-sentential expressions as attempted codifications of items of competent speakers’ (implicit) knowledge. In any event, and whatever independent merit this thesis may have, it is clear that we are no further on with exegesis of the argument of *Grundlagen*.

Sluga’s attempt to set Frege’s recourse to the Context Principle in its ‘historical context’ seems to me a failure. In effect, a number of vaguely similar sounding sentences are paraded from Frege’s writings and from those of other authors, with no serious attempt being made to think through the proper interpretation of any of them. We can grant Sluga the point that it is likely that Frege had read some or all of these authors, and that the way in which he formulated his ideas was influenced by them. The question still remains, whether Frege’s ideas were anticipated, or indeed bequeathed to him by the other writers, especially Lotze, whom Sluga spotlights. Anyone can see that this question cannot be answered simply by the quotation of suggested parallels and the easy talk of ‘influences’, ‘trends’, and ‘currents’, prevalent before and during Frege’s day. There really is no substitute for rational reconstruction of the intellectual projects embodied in his writings.
This is the conclusion, there much more forcibly supported than I can manage here, which almost everyone will, I believe, come to who reads The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, and especially the Appendix on Sluga, with appropriate care.

Dummett interprets the Context Principle as a pair of principles involving sense and reference, respectively. This way of putting the matter seems to me unfortunate, since it invites the charge, Frege having arrived at the sense/reference distinction only after the publication of Grundlagen, that Dummett is wilfully ignoring the historical course of development of Frege's thought. That there are, however, two such distinct principles at work in Grundlagen seems to me absolutely correct. One thesis – Dummett's thesis about sense – is that the meaning of a sub-sentential expression consists not in its association with some worldly item, or mental imagery, but is constituted rather by its contribution to the meaning/truth conditions of sentences in which it features. It is, accordingly, no objection against the significance of numerical expressions that we can form no ideas of, and cannot ostensively individuate their referents. Frege saw that empiricist, psychologist, and formalist accounts of number were, whatever else contributed to them, partly nourished by this semantic atomism – the idea that the meanings of words are in some way prior to their capacity to feature in sentential contexts and are fixed by various sorts of association – in opposition to which he was setting the Context Principle. On the other hand, if the meaning of a word consists in its contribution to the meaning of whole sentences in which it features, then its meaning may be regarded as having been properly determined however that contribution is fixed – whether by defining the word explicitly, or by directly stipulating the truth-conditions of the types of sentential context in which it can occur. It follows that contextual definition is at least a perfectly legitimate mode of procedure in establishing meaning, and that the meanings thereby conferred on sub-sentential expressions are in no way inferior to, or misleadingly compared with, meanings bestowed by more direct methods.

So interpreted, the Context Principle is easily seen to inform both Frege's criticisms of his leading opponents and (at least the initial stages of) his own positive constructions. It therefore signalily passes Currie's test, as far as it goes. Currie's own account, however, finally failed his test because of its inability to explain Frege's preoccupation with the Julius Caesar problem and his underlying platonism. It is the second aspect of the Context Principle – Dummett's thesis about reference – which remedies matters. The two germane features of Frege's platonism, are, first, that he evidently thought that he could relevantly argue for it by reference to features of the overt syntax of arithmetical language – in particular the occurrence of numerical expressions as singular terms (Grundlagen §57) – and, second, that he evidently felt under no obligation to explain how it might be possible for us to get into the kind of direct intellectual contact with numbers, or abstract objects in general, in which our senses place us with material objects. Rather than, with Sluga and Currie, seeking an interpretation of Frege which explains these features as aberrations or as betraying the fact that Frege was not really a platonist at all, we do best to cast about for an interpretation of them which reconciles them with a full-blooded platonism. That is the best course first, because we thereby do justice to passages, like the famous comparison of the mathematician with the geographer, in which Frege's platonism is unmistakable, and second because we shall thereby uncover something of great interest and potential value in the long-running philosophical dispute between platonists and nominalists.

The second thesis is, in effect, that if a genuine singular term occurs as the
subject in true subject–predicate sentences, or occurs in true statements of identity, then it must have a reference. Accordingly if 'genuine singular term' is a syntactically characterizable notion – the idea which Frege was groping for in Grundlagen §57 – and if it is possible to explain the truth-conditions of descriptive, or identity statements involving a class of such terms in such a way that some at least of those statements turn out true, then the relevant terms contained in them stand for something; and so there really are such things as the items for which they stand. Accordingly, once the use of a certain class of expressions has been so fixed that they meet the syntactical requirements on singular termhood and feature in certain appropriate true contexts, there can be no intelligible further question about the reality of their referents.

Frege’s platonism about natural number is thus the thesis that the numerals can be explained in such a way that they (i) figure as genuine singular terms in (ii) true descriptive and identity statements which are susceptible to proof by appropriate means. This might seem to make him a platonist in a rather specialized and technical sense; but it does not really do so, since the implicit claim is that belief in the reality of objects of any sort can ultimately be justified only by vindicating appropriate analogues for them of features (i) and (ii).

I have no space to pursue discussion of this principle here. It is clearly problematic in a number of ways. First, it is open to question whether the notion of a singular term does indeed admit of a general syntactic explanation. Second, Dummett himself has argued that disanalogies in the part played by reference in explanation of the use of abstract and concrete singular terms respectively must force the admission that the notion of reference which Frege wishes to apply to contextually-explained abstract singular terms is at best a watery counterpart of the robust cousin which serves to link an ostensively definable concrete particular with its proper name. Third, there is the question whether, in view of certain plausible causal constraints on the notion of reference stressed in the writings of those who, like Evans and Kripke, have wished to oppose the two-tiered Fregean approach to the semantics of ordinary singular terms, and the acausality of abstract objects, any notion of reference may properly be applied to abstract singular terms; and a related question arises, of course, in connection with causal theories of knowledge. And, fourth, there are particularly delicate and awkward problems concerning the impredicativity of Frege’s actual explanations: both numerical identity and class identity, for example, are explained by reference to contexts involving quantification over domains which have to be interpreted as including numbers and classes respectively if Frege’s constructions are to be taken where he wants them to go – but can it be legitimate to explain a class of putative singular terms by means of quantification over a domain which has to be regarded as including their presumed referents?

The interpretation of the Context Principle which best passes Currie’s test brings these questions into urgent focus. If they can be answered satisfactorily, then Frege, in effect, achieved a decisive victory for platonism; but he did not succeed in presenting it as such and the result is, in any case, a correction of the usual intuitive understanding of that position. On the other hand, if any of these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered, then Fregean platonism at least is indefensible, and we must look to some richer Godelian variety or seek an alternative construal of the multiplicity of apparent abstract singular terms with which both ordinary and mathematical language abound. Either way, the issue will have been advanced. And the moral is that it is only when our reading of great philosophers of the past,
indeed philosophers of any period, is informed by the utmost endeavour analytically to recreate their questions, projects, arguments, and theses – the spirit of which Dummett's original book is a paradigm – that we actually succeed in furthering our philosophical understanding.

No doubt the dangers of this approach to interpretation are great when the recreative effort is allowed too much dominance over attention to text. But these dangers are as nought compared to those of misapplied historical scholarship and the self-important possessiveness to which so much would-be philosophical exegesis is, sadly, prone.

NOTES

3 Currie, Frege: An Introduction to his Philosophy, op. cit., p. 160.
5 Currie, op. cit., p. 170.
6 If, indeed, it does completely fail. For an opposed view, see my Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, Ch. 4, Scots Philosophical Monographs No. 2, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen 1983.
7 See Sluga, Gottlob Frege, op. cit., p. 172; and Dummett, IFP, p. 527.
8 Sluga, op. cit., p. 3.
10 FPL, Intro. p. xvii; be it noted that the claim is made only of Frege's work in logic.
12 There is, in addition, extensive criticism of Sluga's earlier publications throughout IFP, especially in the concluding three chapters on 'Epistemological Atomism', 'The Context Principle' and 'Realism'.
13 IFP, p. 523.
14 IFP, p. 528.
16 Sluga, Gottlob Frege, op. cit., pp. 2–3.
17 Sluga, ibid., p. 3.
18 See Note 6.
19 Wright, op. cit., p. x.
22 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 27 (1976), pp. 79–92.
24 Frege: An Introduction to his Philosophy, op. cit., p. 149.
26 Cf. Wright, op. cit., p. 51.
27 Gottlob Frege, op. cit., p. 55.
28 Sluga, Ibid., p. 94.
29 Sluga, Ibid., pp. 92–94.
30 Nachgelassene Schriften, op. cit., pp. 18–19.
31 Sluga, Gottlob Frege, op. cit., p. 94.
32 IFP, p. 542.
33 Sluga, Gottlob Frege, op. cit., p. 92.
36 IFP, p. 546.
37 Dummett himself makes virtually nothing (IFP, pp. 546-51) of Sluga's first ingredient; but it is impossible to be confident that he does Sluga any injustice.
39 Grundlagen (Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Breslau 1884), §96.
40 For an extended discussion, see my Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, op. cit.
41 See Dummett FPL, Ch. 4; Hale, 'Strawson, Geach and Dummett on Singular Terms and Predications', Synthese, Vol. 42 (1979), pp. 275-95; and Wright, op. cit., Sect. ix.
42 See esp. FPL, Ch. 14, 'Abstract Objects', pp. 498 ff., and IFP, pp. 424-7 and 452-7.
43 For further discussion, see Wright, op. cit., Sect. x.
44 For further discussion, see Wright, ibid., Sects. xi and xii.
45 See Dummett, FPL, Ch. 15, 'Quantification', pp. 531-4 and passim; and Wright, op. cit., Sect. xvii, fn. 8, pp. 180-4.